Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling\u27s model by Luo, Jinjing & Moschini, Giancarlo
Economics Publications Economics
8-9-2019
Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy:
Insights from Hotelling's model
Jinjing Luo
Iowa State University, lexiluo@iastate.edu
Giancarlo Moschini
Iowa State University, moschini@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Energy Policy
Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, and the Statistical Models Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/662. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling's
model
Abstract
We build a structural model of imperfect competition for a retail market that supplies both low-ethanol (E10)
and high-ethanol (E85) gasoline blends. The model permits us to study some impacts of the E85 subsidy
induced by the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, specifically how the pass-through of this subsidy to retail prices
is affected by market power. The model is rooted in Hotelling's horizontal differentiation framework, which is
extended to also represent the imperfect substitutability between E10 and E85 (a vertical product
differentiation attribute). The model naturally captures two sources of imperfect competition in the fuel
market—refueling stations' market power arising from their spatial location, and limited availability of E85
stations. We derive both analytical and numerical solutions for Nash equilibrium outcomes under various
scenarios. In our baseline parameterization, when the penetration of E85 stations is incomplete, we find that
the pass-through rate is about 0.7. Complete penetration of E85 stations leads to near complete pass-through,
notwithstanding the market power enjoyed by stations because of their spatial location. With monopolistic
market power (e.g., collusion), however, with full penetration of E85 stations the pass-through rate is lower.
Moreover, when market power only arises from location differentiation (duopoly model with full penetration
of E85), the pass-through rate converges to one as the subsidy gets large, whereas it converges to zero if a
station has exclusivity in selling E85 (partial penetration of E85) or there is collusion/monopoly power from
collusion.
Keywords
E85, ethanol, gasoline, horizontal and vertical differentiation, market power, passthrough
Disciplines
Behavioral Economics | Economic Theory | Energy Policy | Environmental Policy | Statistical Models
Comments
This is a manuscript of an article published as Luo, Jinjing, and GianCarlo Moschini. "Pass-through of the
policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling's model." Energy Economics (2019). doi: 10.1016/
j.eneco.2019.104478. Posted with permission.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/662
Journal Pre-proof
Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from
Hotelling's model
Jinjing Luo, GianCarlo Moschini
PII: S0140-9883(19)30259-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104478
Reference: ENEECO 104478
To appear in: Energy Economics
Received date: 12 July 2018
Revised date: 30 July 2019
Accepted date: 6 August 2019
Please cite this article as: J. Luo and G. Moschini, Pass-through of the policy-induced
E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling's model, Energy Economics(2019), https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104478
This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such
as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is
not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting,
typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this
version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production
process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers
that apply to the journal pertain.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier.
Pass-through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy: Insights from Hotelling’s model 
Jinjing Luo and GianCarlo Moschini *        
Abstract. We build a structural model of imperfect competition for a retail market that supplies both 
low-ethanol (E10) and high-ethanol (E85) gasoline blends. The model permits us to study some 
impacts of the E85 subsidy induced by the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, specifically how the pass-
through of this subsidy to retail prices is affected by market power. The model is rooted in 
Hotelling’s horizontal differentiation framework, which is extended to also represent the imperfect 
substitutability between E10 and E85 (a vertical product differentiation attribute). The model 
naturally captures two sources of imperfect competition in the fuel market—refueling stations’ 
market power arising from their spatial location, and limited availability of E85 stations. We derive 
both analytical and numerical solutions for Nash equilibrium outcomes under various scenarios. In 
our baseline parameterization, when the penetration of E85 stations is incomplete, we find that the 
pass-through rate is about 0.7. Complete penetration of E85 stations leads to near complete pass-
through, notwithstanding the market power enjoyed by stations because of their spatial location. 
With monopolistic market power (e.g., collusion), however, with full penetration of E85 stations the 
pass-through rate is lower. Moreover, when market power only arises from location differentiation 
(duopoly model with full penetration of E85), the pass-through rate converges to one as the subsidy 
gets large, whereas it converges to zero if a station has exclusivity in selling E85 (partial penetration 
of E85) or there is collusion/monopoly power from collusion.  
Key Words:  E85, ethanol, gasoline, horizontal and vertical differentiation, market power, pass-
through. 
JEL Codes: L13, Q48 
Revised version:  Jul 30, 2019 
* Jinjing Luo is a Ph.D. student and GianCarlo Moschini is a professor and the Pioneer chair in science
and technology policy, both with the Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 
50011, USA. 
Declarations of Interest: None. 
Journal Pre-proof
1 
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, the United States has implemented ambitious policies designed to drastically 
increase the share of renewable energy used for transportation fuels. In particular, the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) greatly expanded the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), 
which entails a set of nested quantity “mandates” for several forms of renewable fuels. The 
schedule originally envisioned by EISA contemplated the use of biofuels growing to 36 billion gallons 
by the year 2022 (Schnepf and Yacobucci 2013). This bold target has had to be scaled back 
somewhat, by repeated waivers by the Environmental Protection Agency, because of the apparent 
failure of commercially-viable cellulosic biofuel supply. Still, the non-cellulosic portion of these 
mandates—mainly corn-based ethanol, but also advanced biofuels such as biodiesel and sugarcane-
based ethanol—are still being pursued at the full level envisioned by EISA (21 billion gallons by the 
year 2022). As these mandate levels have grown over the years, the “blend wall” has materialized. 
This concept refers to the bottleneck that arises when the total quantity of ethanol to be blended 
into the gasoline supply exceeds 10%. 
To understand the root of the blend wall problem, one must note that ethanol is blended into the 
fuel supply essentially by way of two distinct blends: low-ethanol E10 fuel (which contains 10% 
ethanol) and high-ethanol E85 fuel (which contains anywhere from 51% to 83% ethanol, depending on 
seasonality). E10 can be used by all cars, whereas E85 can be used only by flexible fuel vehicles 
(FFVs). Insofar as meeting rising EISA’s mandates requires ethanol use in excess of 10% of the total 
gasoline use, increased consumption of E85 is necessary. By 2013 the RFS required 13.8 billion gallons 
of ethanol, which constituted 10.3% of gasoline consumption, thus exceeding the E10 blend wall 
(Stock 2015). It has become apparent, however, that increasing consumers’ use of E85 is problematic 
(Collantes 2010; Pouliot and Babcock 2014). Specific constraints are due to the low number of FFVs 
(which at present make up approximately 8.5% of the fleet of cars and light trucks), and the limited 
availability of E85 service stations (E85 pumps are available at about 3% of stations).1 Furthermore, 
previous work has found that the majority of FFV drivers actually do not fill up their vehicles with 
E85. 
1 The Alternative Fuels Data Center of the U.S. Department of Energy reports 3,322 E85 stations in 
2017. The total number of gasoline stations in the United States, which has been declining over time, 
was reported to be 114,474 in 2012 by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.  
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Demand for E85 depends crucially on the distinctive features of the choice problem faced by FFV 
drivers. E85 has considerably less energy content than E10—on average, a gallon of E85 only delivers 
about 80% of the miles of a gallon of E10. Consumers who ultimately care about the cost per mile 
traveled, therefore, would require the price of E85 to be suitably discounted relative to that of E10 in 
order to be enticed to buy (Collantes 2010; Pouliot and Babcock 2017). Furthermore, because a tank 
of E85 delivers fewer miles than E10, consumers face an additional convenience cost because of the 
need for more frequent refueling stops. All this suggests that, from a vertical product differentiation 
perspective, E85 is an inferior product relative to E10. Such a conclusion may be partially offset, 
however, if consumers attached some utility to the consumption of renewable energy per se, 
perhaps because of their beliefs about the lower carbon emission of ethanol relative to fossil 
gasoline (i.e., consumers may have “green” preferences).2 But there is also a horizontal 
differentiation component to E85 demand, which is related to the relative scarcity of E85 refueling 
stations: other things equal, drivers located farther from an E85 station will be less willing to refill 
their tank with this fuel (relative to the ubiquitous E10).  
The heterogeneity of consumers, vis-à-vis the structural determinants of demand, suggests that E10 
and E85 are imperfect demand substitutes. If expanding consumption of E85 is required to 
overcome the blend wall, the structural determinants of E85 demand will matter in translating price 
signals into consumption decisions. Such price signals are supposed to be induced by the policy 
design of the RFS. As shown by Lapan and Moschini (2012), in a competitive setting, a quantity 
mandate is isomorphic to a combination of a tax (on fossil fuel) and a subsidy (for ethanol) that is 
revenue neutral. The use of renewable identification numbers (RINs) to enforce the mandates makes 
this equivalence transparent. These tradable instruments command a price whenever the mandate is 
binding, which reflects the cost of complying with the RFS at the margin (Korting and Just 2017). The 
price of RINs quantifies the extent of the subsidy for ethanol and tax for fossil gasoline. Because E85 
contains substantially more ethanol and less gasoline than E10, positive RIN prices translate into a 
policy-induced subsidy for E85, relative to E10.  
If the policy-induced subsidy for E85 is fully reflected in retail fuel prices, then consumers would be 
given the proper market signal: tighter RFS mandates would lead to higher RIN prices, increasing the 
spread between E10 and E85 RIN prices, ultimately resulting in higher E85 consumption. Recent 
2 Indeed, in an early empirical analysis of E85 demand, Anderson (2012) found that a substantial 
fraction of FFV drivers were willing to pay a premium for E85 fuel. 
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empirical work, however, has raised questions on the extent of this pass-though. Knittel, Meiselman, 
and Stock (2017) find that, whereas RIN price pass-through is fairly complete at the wholesale level, 
there appears to be little or no pass-through of RIN prices to retail E85 prices. Market power is the 
chief market imperfection typically invoked to rationalize a less-than-full pass-through of an 
(exogenous) cost differential. Lade and Bushnell (2019) emphasize the dynamics of the process and, 
unlike Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2017), find that pass-through of E85 subsidy is on average one-
half to three-quarters. Li and Stock (2019), utilizing station-level data from Minnesota from 2012 to 
2015, estimate the state-level pass-through rate for E85 to be approximately 0.5. Similar to Lade and 
Bushnell (2019), they also find that indicators of local monopoly for E85 stations correlate with lower 
pass-through.  
As noted by Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2017, p. 1082), “… a central question for RFS policy is 
whether this pass-through occurs at the retail level.” The empirical contributions cited in the 
foregoing do not provide a conclusive answer, and in fact suggest the possibility that imperfect 
competition at the retail level may be key. Complete pass-through is a feature of perfect 
competition, in the sense that goods are priced at marginal costs. The rate by which equilibrium 
prices are affected by a given cost change, though, in general depends on the elasticities of demand 
and supply. With constant marginal costs, as maintained below, the E85 subsidy is fully transmitted 
to retail prices under perfect competition. Under imperfect competition, however, the pass-through 
rate also depends on conduct parameters for market power and the shape of demand curves (Weyl 
and Fabinger 2013). In the context of gasoline retail, what pass-through should one expect? And, 
what are the critical factors affecting the subsidy pass-through rate?  
To address these questions, this paper develops a structural model suitable to study the pass-
through of the policy-induced E85 subsidy to retail prices. Our model is rooted in Hotelling’s (1929) 
spatial competition model, a standard approach in industrial organization whereby firms are 
endowed with some market power by the presumption of product differentiation. This structure 
captures in a natural way the heterogeneity of consumers, vis-à-vis the locations of refueling 
stations. We extend this horizontal product differentiation framework to also accommodate 
consumers’ heterogeneous preferences with respect to E85, a vertical differentiation feature that 
appears essential to the context being modeled. Consideration of more than one dimension of 
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product differentiation makes models rather unwieldy.3 The model we develop is, inevitably, rather 
stylized. Yet the model captures important features of the structure of demand for E10 and E85 
discussed earlier, and provides a natural way to represent the role of imperfect competition at the 
retail level. The advantage of a structural model, albeit a stylized one, is that of providing a vehicle by 
which we can isolate the effects of various factors and assess their contribution towards favoring or 
impeding pass-through. As such, this paper complements the emerging literature, noted earlier, on 
the empirical assessment of RIN pass-through to gasoline prices (Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock 2017; 
Lade and Bushnell 2019; Li and Stock 2019). 
To investigate the impact of E85 availability, our benchmark model is a duopoly setting with 
incomplete penetration of E85 stations—specifically, two stations, only one of which sells E85. As a 
comparison, we also investigate the duopoly model with only E10 fuel (this is the basic Hotelling’s 
model), and the duopoly model where both firms sell both fuels (E10 and E85). Except for the basic 
Hotelling duopoly model, and one of the monopoly models we consider, analytic solutions for the 
Nash equilibrium are not possible in our extended models. Hence, we solve our models numerically. 
To that end, we calibrate the values of parameters in the various models and solve for Nash 
equilibrium results under alternative parameter settings.  
Our results show that pass-through is incomplete with incomplete penetration of E85 stations. In the 
benchmark model, we estimate the pass-through rate to be about 0.7. When firms have no 
exclusivity of selling E85 (i.e., E85 is offered at all locations), however, the pass-through is near 
complete even though firms still have some market power from horizontal differentiation. 
Moreover, our results show that the market generally exhibits lower pass-through when the E85 
subsidy is higher, and when market power is higher (the two stations are a monopoly). Our results 
also show that prices of E10 at both location barely change with the E85 subsidy (under the working 
assumption that the cost of E10 fuel is constant). Interestingly we show that, in the model with 
partial penetration of E85 stations, the E10 price at the same location with E85 is higher than the E10 
price at the other location in duopoly, whereas the relation reverses in monopoly. For demands, we 
show that E85 consumption increases with the subsidy, as expected, and the decrease in E10 
consumption is larger at stations with both E10 and E85 pumps, no matter whether in duopoly or in 
monopoly. 
3 Conceptual models include Neven and Thisse (1990), Ferreira and Thisse (1996), and Gabszewicz 
and Wauthy (2012). Recent applications include Brécard (2014), Di Comite, Thisse and Vandenbussche 
(2014), Norman et al. (2016), and Pennerstofer (2017). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on framing pass-through rate in 
our setting. In section 3, we specify drivers’ preferences and derive demand functions for various 
cases of interest. In section 4, we calibrate some of the critical parameters of the model. Section 5 
presents the results for the main duopoly models we consider. Section 6 considers the issue of 
market power further, in the context of a monopolized market. Finally, section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Background
We begin with a simple example that shows how subsidy pass-through works in the context of the 
simplest Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We then review how the E85 subsidy 
arises from the basic mechanisms of the RFS. Both of these discussions point to the usefulness of 
looking at the subsidy pass-through to the spread between E10 and E85 retail prices, a feature that 
we will then investigate with the analytical model that we develop below. 
2.1 A simple motivating example 
To motivate the analysis that we propose, consider the textbook linear-city setup where two firms 
are located at the extreme of a line of unit length, each offering a product to a population of 
consumers, with unit demand, who are uniformly distributed on the unit segment (see, e.g., Tirole, 
1988, pp. 279-280). The two products are perceived as imperfect substitutes, by any one consumer, 
because of the consumer’s own location. To fix ideas, think of the product sold by firm A at location 
L0 as E10 gasoline, and the product sold by firm B at location L1 as E85 gasoline (presently we will 
discuss why this is too simplistic, and how the model needs to be generalized). The two firms 
compete in prices by setting Ap  and Bp , respectively. If the consumers’ reservation value for one 
unit of either good is sufficiently large, so that the market is covered, then the demand functions 
facing the two firms are easily obtained:  
1
, , , ,
2 2
j i
i
p p
q i j A B i j
t

        (1) 
where 0t   is the “travel cost” parameter. Suppose the firms have constant per-unit costs Ac  and 
Bc , respectively. It is readily found that the Nash equilibrium prices are: 
*
2
, , , ,
3
i j
i
c c
p t i j A B i j

           (2) 
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In this setting, we ask what the implications would be of a tax/subsidy on these products. Suppose 
first that a per-unit subsidy 0s   is provided to both products. Then it is readily seen that both 
equilibrium prices decline by exactly the amount s   (i.e., there is 100% pass-through), and the 
equilibrium quantities are unchanged. Alternatively, suppose that only product B enjoys the per-unit 
subsidy s .4 It is easy to see that, in this case  
* 1
3
Ap
s

 

  and  
* 2
3
Bp
s

 

   (3) 
Interestingly, both prices decline in equilibrium. The subsidy-induced decline in product B’s marginal 
cost provides an incentive to reduce Bp . Furthermore, because prices are “strategic complements” 
in this setting, this leads firm A to also reduce its price. In equilibrium, although the subsidy does not 
apply to both products, the subsidy to product B reduces both prices. 
If the purpose of the subsidy is to incentivize consumption of product B, then from the demand 
functions above it is clear that what matter is the net effect of the subsidy on the price difference 
* *( )A Bp p  . When the subsidy only applies to product B, the pass-through rate on this price 
difference is: 
 * * 1
3
A Bp p
s
 


(4) 
Thus, we conclude that, in this imperfectly competitive setting, the effectiveness of the subsidy to 
promote use of product B is blunted by the exercise of market power from horizontal differentiation, 
and by the fact that prices are strategic complements.  
This model is clearly too simplistic to capture the stylized facts of E10 and E85 gasoline retail: in the 
foregoing, the two products are sold at different locations by different firms, whereas in reality E10 
and E85 are typically marketed by refueling stations that sell both products; furthermore, this purely 
horizontal setting does not capture the vertical differentiation dimension that is an essential feature 
of E10 and E85 gasoline demand. Below we provide a suitably generalized model. Yet, this simple 
model shows some of the reason why limited pass-through may arise in an imperfectly competitive 
setting, and why it is instructive to look at the subsidy pass-through on the products’ equilibrium 
price difference.    
4 For example, considering the RIN obligations in 2013, Stock (2015) concluded that the net effect of 
RIN prices was a near-zero subsidy for E10 ($0.01/gal) and a large subsidy for E85 ($0.50/gal). 
Journal Pre-proof
7 
2.2 Pass-through of energy policy effects 
Conceptually, the pass-through rate measures how consumer price is affected by a small change in a 
per-unit tax or subsidy. In the context of the RFS, framing the pass-through of the policy-implied 
tax/subsidy effects requires some attention to the mechanisms by which RIN prices affect costs of 
producers and retailers. In Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2017) RIN pass-through rate is measured as 
the partial effect of RIN obligation spread on retail price spread for E10 and E85. Lade and Bushnell 
(2019) measures how retail price of E85 changes in response to the change in E85 RIN subsidy.  Li and 
Stock (2019) note that the changes in wholesale spread of E10 and E85 are mainly driven by 
fluctuations in RIN prices and estimate how the E85 retail price responses to the changes in the 
wholesale spread. As explained in more details below, in this study we define the pass-through rate 
as the impact of the E85 subsidy, induced by the RFS, on the spread between E10 and E85 retail 
prices. 
To illustrate how the RFS tax/subsidy implications filter to retail prices in the context of the model we 
develop, we presume a competitive refining/blending industry that operates under constant returns 
to scale.5 Specifically, we consider a simplified structure where fossil gasoline and corn ethanol, 
which are blended into E10 and E85, can be obtained at constant per-unit costs. Such “producer 
prices” are denoted gp  and ep  , respectively. [All prices are expressed in natural units, e.g., $/gallon].
To translate such prices into the costs faced by retailers, we start by noting that the RFS requires 
obligated parties (e.g., refineries) to retire a bundle of RINs (associated with the requirements of the 
RFS nested mandates) for every gallon of fossil gasoline sold. Let the cost of this bundle be denoted 
by B ,6 and let R  denote the RIN price associated with ethanol (i.e., the price of D6 RINs). 
Throughout the paper, we assume E10 includes 10% ethanol and E85 uses 74% ethanol (as maintained 
by Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock 2017). Then, wholesale prices of blended fuels satisfy: 
   10 0.10 0.90wE e gp p R p B     (5) 
5 This is assumption is attractive for its simplicity, but it is also consistent with the pass-through 
evidence presented by Pouliot, Smith, and Stock (2017) who estimate RIN pass-through at the rack 
and cannot reject complete RIN pass-through to wholesale fuel prices. Knittel. Meiselman, and Stock 
(2017) also find complete pass-through of RIN prices to wholesale gasoline prices. 
6 Using the percentage standards for the 2017 year, B  is determined by the obligated party’s need to 
“retire” for each gallon of fossil fuel sold, 0.0167 D4 RINs to meet the biodiesel mandate, 0.0238 D4 
or D5 RINs to meet the total advanced biofuel mandate, and 0.107 D4, D5 or D6 RINs to meet the 
total renewable fuel mandate.  
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   85 0.74 0.26wE e gp p R p B    (6) 
The retailing industry takes the wholesale prices 10
w
Ep  and 85
w
Ep  as given, such that their retailing
costs can be represented as 10 10
w
E Ec p    and 85 85
w
E Ec p   , where   is the sum of motor fuel
taxes and per-unit marketing/retailing costs. 
In the absence of the RFS policy (i.e., 0R   and 0B  ), the cost of the two fuel blends to retailers 
are fully determined by the producer prices gp  and ep  (plus the aforementioned term  ). The RFS, 
however, introduces product-specific tax/subsidies equal to (0.1 0.9 )R B  for E10 fuel and 
(0.74 0.26 )R B  for E85 fuel (as in Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock 2017).  A more insightful analysis of 
how policy measures are passed through to retail prices can be obtained by looking at the cost 
advantage for the E85 fuel, defined as 10 85E Ec c . From the foregoing, it is clear that this cost 
advantage is partly determined by the producer prices  gp  and ep  (which we will hold constant in
our analysis), and by the net subsidy to the E85 fuel (relative to E10). Specifically: 
 10 85 0.64E E g ec c p p s    (7) 
where s  denotes the per-gallon subsidy implied by the policy: 
 0.64s R B      (8) 
The central question we want to address in this paper concerns how the RFS policy provides signals 
to consumers, vis-à-vis their choice of fuel type.  A “more stringent” RFS policy would entail higher 
RIN prices, increasing both the D6 RIN price R  and the cost of the RIN bundle obligations B , which 
translate directly into an increase in the relative subsidy s  enjoyed by E85. As noted, with a 
competitive retailing sector the retail prices satisfy 10 10E Ep c  and 85 85E Ep c . Thus, from (7), the 
“pass-through” rate of the policy subsidy would be  10 85 1E Ep p s    . That is, the policy subsidy
s  enjoyed by E85 would be completely reflected in the retail price spread, i.e., completely passed 
through to consumers.  The model that we develop permits us to investigate the extent to which 
such a complete pass-through fails under the assumed imperfect competition setting.  This way of 
characterizing pass-through is similar to the approach used by Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2017). 
Their (empirical) motivation for looking at the price spread between E10 and E85 was different from 
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ours, but the fact remains that looking at the price spread between E10 and E85 provides a clean and 
informative summary on the nature of the pass-through effects. 
3. The Model
We study the duopoly setting where two stations are located at either end of the unit segment 
(these locations are labeled L0 and L1, respectively). A useful model for comparison is that where 
both stations only sell E10 fuel, which corresponds to the basic Hotelling duopoly model. Our main 
model is that with incomplete penetration of E85 stations: the station at L0 offers both E10 and E85, 
whereas the gas station at L1 only sells the conventional E10. Finally, we also consider the case of 
complete penetration of E85, where both firms sell both types of fuels. The two stations maximize 
their separate profits, and we derive the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game. To proceed, 
however, we first need to specify consumers’ preferences. 
3.1 Preferences 
A unit mass of consumers are uniformly distributed on  0,1 . Each consumer has a car, either a 
normal car or an FFV. The proportion of cars that are FFV is  .  Consumers can fill the tank at either 
station to drive a distance of M miles. Her utility from driving one mile is denoted as u . If [0,1]x  
denotes a consumer’s own location, she incurs a cost (disutility) of tx  when refueling at L0, and 
(1 )t x  when refueling at L1, where the parameter 0t   captures the intensity of consumers’ cost 
due to their heterogeneous location attribute. This cost is meant to capture the disutility associated 
with the time and travel cost associated with a refueling stop, and it is independent of the type of 
fuel purchased. The prices for the two fuels of interest are denoted by jp , where the superscript 
{0,1}  denotes the location of the station and the subscript { , }j A B  denotes the type of fuel.7 
Note that, for notational simplicity, the subscript A will refer to E10 fuel, and the subscript B will refer 
to E85 fuel (as a mnemonic, B = biofuel). For a consumer located at x , if she chooses to refuel with 
E10 at L0, the payoff associated with this choice would be  
7 These prices are quoted in natural units (e.g., $/gallon). Because of the lower energy content of E85 
fuels, some authors prefer to express prices (and quantities) at equal energy content. For example, 
Pouliot and Babcock (2014) measure the quantity of E10 in E85-equivalent units, with prices 
appropriately scaled. As will become apparent in what follows, in our context it is more instructive to 
deal with quantity and prices for both fuels in their natural units, and to separately keep track of the 
lower energy content of E85.  
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0 0
A A
A A
x
M M
U uM p t
k 
 
     
 

  
  
           (9) 
where j  is the efficiency of fuel j  (miles per gallon), and k  denotes the size of the tank (gallons). 
Thus, AM   measures the number of gallons needed for M miles, and AM k is the number of 
service stops needed for M miles.  
If the consumer owns an FFV and chooses to refuel with E85 at L0, her payoff from driving M miles 
would be 
0 0
B
B B
B x
M M
U uM p t
k 
 
     
 

  
  
           (10) 
Note that drivers who refuel with E85 are penalized from more frequent refueling (because B A  , 
then B AM k M k   ), and how much they are penalized depends on their location, x . 
Some normalizations permit us to simplify these payoffs without loss of generality. Specifically, let 
t t k , normalize 1AM   , re-define u uM , and let A B   . Then the payoffs in (9) and (10) 
can be re-written as:  
0 0
0 0
B
A
B
Au tx
u tx
U p
U p 
 
 

(11) 
Here, t  is a re-scaled Hotelling travel cost parameter, and the coefficient   captures the energy 
efficiency of E10 relative to E85 (i.e., the energy content in one gallon of E10 is equivalent to that of 
 gallons of E85). Also, 1.25   is a known constant in our model.8
This formulation maintains a systematic vertical ranking between E10 and E85: if the two fuels were 
priced equally in energy equivalent terms (i.e., 0 0A Bp p ) then E85 would be dominated by E10 for
all consumers (because 1  ). But we augment this basic structure by introducing a vertical 
differentiation parameter to capture the fact that consumers may have heterogeneous attitudes 
towards E85. Specifically, they may perceive some extra benefit from using E85 because they 
consider E85  a “green” fuel with lower environmental impact, or they may associate a lower payoff 
8 Given the assumed 74% average ethanol content of E85, and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) energy content of gasoline and ethanol (see, e.g., Moschini, Lapan, and Kim 
2017), then 1.25  . 
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to E85 because of lack of awareness of E85 (Pouliot, Liao, and Babcock 2018) or because of the lower 
driving range permitted by one tank of E85 (Collantes 2010). To account for these effects, we replace 
the term u  by ( )u   in the payoff associated with E85, where the parameter ,      , with
0  and 0  , captures drivers’ heterogeneous attitude towards E85. In solving the model we will
assume that   is uniformly distributed on the support ,    .  In the paper, we refer to   as
drivers’ type and x  as their location. 
This representation of consumers’ utility nests two dimensions of product differentiation. The 
parameter   measures the degree of consumer heterogeneity with respect to vertical 
differentiation, whereas the location x  characterizes their horizontal differentiation. As both  and 
 approach zero, the heterogeneous component of vertical differentiation disappears. The
parameter t  measures the intensity of preferences vis-à-vis horizontal differentiation. As 0t , 
horizontal differentiation disappears. 
3.2 The model with one E85 station at location L0 
This is our main model. Both gas stations provide E10, whereas only the gas station at L0 provides 
E85. For owners of normal cars, the payoffs associated with the two possible choices are: 
if refuel with E  at L
if refuel with E  at L1
0
11
0 10 0
(1 ) 10
A
A A
AU u p tx
U u p t x
  

  

 
(12) 
Drivers of FFVs face a richer set of alternatives, however: the choice of station, and whether to refuel 
with E10 or E85. Hence, the payoffs associated with the choices available to an FFV driver are:  
 
if refuel with E  at L
if refuel with E  at L
if refuel with E  at L0
0 0
1 1
0 0
10 0
1 10 1
85
A A
A A
B B
U u p tx
U u p t x
U u p tx  
   

   

   
(13) 
For normal car drivers, their choice of E10 at L0 or E10 at L1 depends on their location x  and relative 
prices of E10 at two locations. FFV drivers can choose E10 at L0, E10 at L1, or E85 at L0 based on their 
type   and location x , as well as relative prices of each fuel, 0Ap ,
1
Ap , and 
0
Bp . To get the aggregate
demands of each fuel, now we inquire into each driver’s decision on location and type to refuel. 
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For given fuel prices, normal car drivers’ payoffs from refueling at location L0 and L1 are shown as 
the orange line and the blue line respectively in Figure 1. The indifferent E10 consumer, identified by 
the condition 0 1A AU U , has location 
         
1 01
1
2
A Ap px
t
 
  
 
                 (14) 
So, normal car drivers located at the left of x refuel with E10 at L0, whereas they choose to refuel at 
L1 if located at the right of x . 
Figure 1. FFV drivers’ choice of fuel at given prices 0Ap  ,
1
Ap , and 
0
Bp
Figure 1 illustrates FFV drivers’ payoffs from each refueling option. If they choose to refuel with E10, 
the orange line and the blue line represent their payoff just as for normal car drivers. If they choose 
to refuel with E85, the payoff from refueling falls into the area between two parallel black lines 
(associated with the upper and lower bounds of the   parameter) because of the heterogeneous 
preferences over E85. In Figure 1, [𝑢 − 𝜆𝑝𝐵 − 𝜆𝑡𝑥 + ?̅?] represents the payoff from E85 for a
consumer with the highest preference for ethanol, whereas [𝑢 − 𝜆𝑝𝐵 − 𝜆𝑡𝑥 + 𝜃] represents the 
0 1
𝑥
  
𝑥  𝑥  
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payoff from E85 for a consumer with the lowest preference for ethanol; [𝑢 − 𝑝𝐴
0 − 𝑡𝑥] is the payoff
from E10 at L0, and [𝑢 − 𝑝𝐴
 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥)] is the payoff from E10 at L1. FFV drivers choose the type of 
fuel that maximizes their payoff.  
For drivers who are located at the left of x  (defined by equation (14)), the option of E10 at L1 is 
dominated by E10 at L0. The fuel choice is determined by comparing payoffs from the left two 
refueling options at L0. The indifferent consumer, identified by the condition 0 0B AU U , has a 
heterogeneity parameter that also depends on her location: 
  0 0( ) 1 B Ax tx p p                    (15) 
Hence, a driver would choose to refuel with E85 at L0 if her type satisfies ( )x  , and she would 
choose E10 at L0 otherwise.  
For drivers located at the right of x , the choice of E10 at L0 is dominated by E10 at L1. The 
coordinates of the indifferent consumer identified by the condition 10B AU U , for x x ,  are: 
  0 1( ) 1 B Ax tx t p p                (16) 
An FFV driver chooses to refuel with E85 at L0 if ( )x  , and use E10 at L1 otherwise. 
Note that the indifferent consumer type is an increasing function of x  in both equations (15) and 
(16) , which implies that only FFV drivers with high enough preferences would choose E85 if they are 
located farther from the E85 station at L0. Evaluating equation (16) at    and inverting it yields 
the farthest location consistent with a possible choice of E85 at L0:  
 
1 0
1
1
A Bp p tx
t
 

  


   (17) 
This point is shown in Figure 1 as the location of the intersection of 0BU  and 
1
AU  at   . 
FFV drivers’ choices are depicted in Figure 2, where the x  axis denotes FFV drivers’ location and the 
y  axis denotes the type  . In the rectangle  0,1 ,     , FFV drivers at the top left would choose
to refuel with E85 from L0—these are FFV drivers who are close to L0 and have high preferences for 
E85; FFV drivers at the bottom left would choose to refuel with E10 from L0—these are FFV drivers 
who are close to L0 and have low preferences for E85; FFV drivers on the right portion of the 
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rectangle would choose E10 at L1—these are FFV drivers who are close to L1. The threshold 0  (type 
of consumer at 0x   who is indifferent between E10 at L0 and E85 at L0) in Figure 2 is obtained from 
evaluating equation (15) at 0x  , while   (type the consumer at x x  who is indifferent between 
E10 at L0 and E85 at L0 and E10 at L1) is derived from evaluating the same equation at x x . 
Figure 2. FFV drivers’ demands in the one E85 station model, baseline scenario (“case 2”) 
Let 0Ad , 
1
Ad , and 
0
Bd   denote the market demands for E10 at L0, E10 at L1, and E85 at L0 respectively.
These demand functions can be obtained by integrating individual demands over the distributions of 
individual characteristics. Given the assumed uniform distribution of x  and  , then, from Figure 2, 
we can express 0Ad , 
1
Ad , and 
0
Bd  as functions of the threshold levels in the  ,x   space:
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
0
0
0
0 1
1 1 1
2
1
2
2
2 2
2
1 1 1
2
A
B
A
d x x
d x x x
d x x x x
  
 
 
    

   
  
 
 
 
  

   
   
  
  
       
 
 (18) 
θ
x
0 1
?̅?
E85 from L0
𝑥 
E10 from L0
E10 from L1
?̅?
𝜃 0
𝜃 
𝜃
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In equation system (18), 0Ad  and 
1
Ad  are sums of E10 demands from both normal car drivers and FFV 
drivers. In 0Ad ,  1 x  is the demand of normal car drivers for E10 at L0:  1   is the fraction of 
normal car drivers in the market, and x  measures the fraction of normal car drivers who refuel with 
E10 at L0 (normal car drivers who are located at the left of x ) . The second element of 0Ad  involves 
the term    00.5 2x        , which is the fraction of FFV drivers who choose to refuel with
E10 at L0 (indicated by the area of the bottom left trapezoid in Figure 2). The demand for E10 at L1, 
1
Ad , is constructed in the same way. For 
0
Bd ,   captures the E85 demand of a single FFV driver (recall 
that consumers need   gallons of E85 to drive the same number of miles as one gallon of E10). The 
expression in the square brackets represents the fraction of FFV drivers who choose E85 at L0 (a sum 
of the area of a trapezoid and the area of a triangle in Figure 2). Because we have normalized the 
mass of drivers in the market to one, and the market is covered, then 0 1 0 1A A Bd d d    .
Recalling that the threshold levels in the  ,x   space are themselves functions of the fuel prices 0Ap
, 1Ap , and 
0
Bp , equation (18) implicitly defines the demand functions facing the retailing stations.
Actually, with different combinations of prices, the demands of FFV drivers for each fuel may differ 
from what is shown in Figure 2. There are five scenarios in total (in addition to the extreme cases 
where no FFV driver chooses E85, or all FFV drivers refuel with E85). What is illustrated in Figure 2 is 
the case that arises under the baseline parameter values (discussed below) and it implies that FFV 
drivers do not refuel with E85 if they are located far enough from the E85 station and/or they have 
low enough preferences for E85. The other four scenarios are shown in Figure 3. When 0Bp  is 
relatively high, only FFV drivers with higher preferences for E85 and who are close to L0 would 
choose E85, i.e., for some consumers it might be that   (recall that   is from evaluating 
equation (15) at x x ); this is “case 1” in Figure 4. “Case 2” is the baseline scenario illustrated in 
Figure 2 and already discussed in the foregoing. With relatively low 0Bp , it may be the case that 
0   (recall that 0  is from evaluating equation (15) at 0x  ), so that even FFV drivers with low
preferences for E85 choose to refuel with E85; such a situation arises for “case 3”, “case 4,” and 
“case 5” in Figure 3. Case 5 differs from case 4 in that all FFV drivers on the left of x  choose to refuel 
with E85. 0x  and 1x  in Figure 3 are obtained from evaluating equation (15) and (16), respectively, at
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  ;  0x  and 1x  are obtained from evaluating these two equations, respectively, at   . A 
summary of all threshold levels is reported in Table A1 in Appendix A, which also provides more 
details on how the associated demand structure evolves with different combinations of fuel prices. 
Figure 3. FFV drivers’ demands in the one E85 station model, other scenarios 
3.3 The model with both E10 and E85 at both stations 
To capture the effects of market penetration of E85 stations, we next consider the situation where 
both gas stations offer both E10 and E85. For normal car drivers, payoffs from using E10 at two 
locations are still as in equation (12).  As for FFV drivers, their payoffs for the various choice 
possibilities are as follows: 
0 1
?̅?
E85 from 
L0
𝑥 
𝜃 0
E10 from L0 E10 from L1
𝑥̅0
𝜃
0 1
?̅?
E85 from L0
𝑥 
E10 
from L0
E10 from L1

𝑥̅𝑥0
Case 1 Case 3
x
0 1
?̅?
E85 from L0
𝑥 
𝜃 
E10 
from L0
E10 from L1

𝑥0 0 1
?̅?
E85 from L0
𝑥 
𝜃 
E10 
from L1

𝑥
Case 4 Case 5
x
xx
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 
 
if refuel E  at location 
if refuel E  at location 
if refuel E  at location 
if refuel E  at location 
0 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
10 0
1 10 1
85 0
1 85 1
A A
A A
B B
B B
U u p tx
U u p t x
U u p tx
U u p t x
  
  
   

   

   

    
(19) 
We denote the locations of indifferent consumers for E10 and E85 as Ax  and Bx , respectively. From 
the conditions 0 1A AU U  and 
0 1
B BU U , we have: 
 
 
1 0
1 0
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
A A
B B
A
B
x
x
p p
t
p p
t

 



(20) 
In this symmetric model, without loss of generality, assume A Bx x , which implies 
1 0 1 0
A A B Bp p p p   . For drivers who are located at the left of Ax , fuel option of E10 at L1 is
dominated by the option of E10 at L0; for drivers who are located at the left of Bx , the fuel option of 
E85 at L1 is dominated by the option of E85 at L0. The FFV driver who is indifferent between E10 and 
E85 at L0 is identified by equation (15), and the FFV driver who is indifferent between the two fuels 
at L1 is identified by the condition 1 1BAU U , yielding 
    1 1( ) 1 1 B Ax t x p p                  (21) 
The demands of FFV drivers for each fuel are illustrated in Figure 4. As before, 0  is still from 
evaluating equation (15) at 0x  , and B  is by evaluating the equation at Bx x . Similarly, 
1
1  is
obtained from evaluating equation (21) at 1x  , and A  is by evaluating the equation at Ax x . FFV 
drivers’ fuel choices, under all combinations of   and x , are shown in Figure 4.  
Demands for fuels in the market are denoted as 0Ad , 
1
Ad , 
0
Bd , and 
1
Bd . As before, these demands are 
obtained by integrating individual demands over the distribution of individual characteristics on 
 0,1 ,     . Summing up the demands of all FFV drivers and normal car drivers, we can get
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    
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  
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  
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  
(22) 
Figure 4. FFV drivers’ demands in the two E85 stations model, baseline scenario 
Again recalling that the threshold levels in the  ,x   space are themselves function of the fuel 
prices, equation (22) implicitly defines the demand functions facing the retailing stations.  
Of course, in this symmetric model, in equilibrium the fuel prices will satisfy 1 0A Ap p  and
1 0
B Bp p
(as we assume the costs of the same fuels are the same for two stations). When both stations 
provide E85, again we find that multiple demand configurations can arise, depending on fuel prices. 
What we discuss in the text is the case that arises under the baseline parameter values (see below). 
𝜃 0
θ
x
0 1
𝜃̅
E85 from L0
𝑥 𝐴
E10 from L0 E10 from L1
𝑥 𝐵
E85 from L1
𝜃 
𝜃 𝐵
𝜃 𝐴
𝜃
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It implies that, with full penetration of E85 stations, any FFV driver may choose to refuel with E85 if 
she has a high enough type   (regardless of her location x ). There are a total of three cases. In 
addition to that illustrated in Figure 4, there is the scenario under high E85 price, such that B   
and A   (only FFV drivers close to either station with high preferences for E85 would choose to 
refuel with E85) and the scenario under low E85 price such that 0   and 1   (most FFV drivers
would select E85 ). When retail price of E85 is too high or too low relatively, there might be no 
consumption of E85 or all FFV drivers may choose to refuel with E85. A full discussion of all these 
cases can be found in Appendix A. 
3.4 Nash equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium requires that each station’s choice of prices be a payoff-maximizing “best 
response” to the choices of the other station, and this must hold simultaneously for both stations. 
To compute the Nash equilibrium, we first derive each gas station’s profit under each case. The 
working assumption is that of constant marginal cost Ac  and Bc  for E10 and E85, respectively, 
where the unit cost Bc  for E85 embeds the subsidy s . We further assume that fuel costs are the 
same for all stations. 
For the benchmark model without E85 fuel (no E85 stations at either location), given the demand 
functions in equation (2) in section 2.1, the profits of the two stations are:  
 
 
0 0 1 0
1 01 1
1
2
1
2
A A A A
A A A A
p c p p t
t
p c p p t
t


    
  

 
This is the textbook parameterization of the basic Hotelling’s model, yielding the Nash equilibrium 
solution (see, e.g., Tirole 1988): 
0 1 0 1 0 11, ,
2 2A A A A A
t
p p t c d d        
The equilibrium values of these and other variables of interest are reported in Table 1 in section 5.1. 
For the model with only one E85 station, the profits of the two gas stations are: 
   
 
00 0 0 0
1 1 1
A A A B B
A A
B
A
p c d p c d
p c d


  
 
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where the demand functions are derived in section 3.2. 
For the model with both stations offering both fuels, the profits of gas stations at locations L0 and L1 
are  
   
   
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
A A A B B B
A A A B B B
p c d p c d
p c d p c d


  
 


where the demand functions are as derived in section 3.3. In the duopoly setting, the gas station at 
L0 chooses 0Ap  and 
0
Bp , and its competitor chooses 
1
Ap  and
1
Bp . In this symmetric market, we are 
looking for the symmetric equilibrium where 0 1A Ap p  and
0 1
B Bp p , so 1 2A Bx x  . A complete 
list for the equilibrium values of several variables of interest is reported in Table 1 below. 
Analytic solutions for the Nash equilibrium are not possible in models with E85, even the symmetric 
one. To proceed, we have computed the Nash equilibrium numerically, as follows. From the payoff 
functions defined in the foregoing we derive analytic first order conditions (FOCs) that define the 
best response functions for each station. In the model with one E85 station, we have two best 
response functions for the gas station at L0 and one for the gas station at L1. In the model with two 
E85 stations, we have two best response functions for each gas station. The best response functions 
are solved simultaneously in Matlab using vpasolve. Multiple systems of solutions from the FOCs are 
possible, hence we relied on local second order conditions (SOCs) for a maximum to narrow the 
possible candidates. Eventually, only one system of solutions survives the SOCs, which is the Nash 
equilibrium outcome. To perform this numerical process, of course, we first need the values of all 
parameters, which is what we do in the next section. 
4. Parameter calibration
Two of the models discussed in the foregoing are not amenable to an analytic solution of the Nash 
equilibrium. To solve this model numerically, the first step is to calibrate the parameters of the 
model.  The parameter   captures the energy efficiency of E10 compared to E85, which, as discussed 
earlier, is a known constant 1.25  .  In addition, the model has eight other parameters:  
(i). s , the per-unit subsidy of E85; 
(ii). Ac , the marginal cost of E10; 
(iii). Bc , the marginal cost of E85; 
(iv).  , the fraction of FFVs; 
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(v). u , consumers’ reservation utility from driving one gallon of E10; 
(vi). t , Hotelling’s “travel cost” parameter; 
(vii).  , the upper bound of drivers’ preference parameter for E85; 
(viii).  , the lower bound of drivers’ preference parameter for E85. 
Prices ( 0Ap ,
1
Ap , 
0
Bp , and 
1
Bp ), and demands (
0
Ad , 
1
Ad , 
0
Bd , and 
1
Bd ), are all endogenous variables. To 
calibrate these parameters, we use relevant features of the model along with market data pertaining 
to the year 2017.  
The subsidy s  captures the policy-induced subsidy for E85, relative to E10. Following the discussion in 
section 2.2, the subsidy is constructed by equation (8). In equation (8), 0.72R   is the price of D6 
RINs and 0.0836B   is the cost of compliance for a gallon of obligated conventional gasoline. 9 So, 
0.5143s  .  
Ac  and Bc  correspond to the terms 10Ec  and 85Ec  of section 2.2.  We note here that the producer 
price gp  is not observed. What we observe is the RIN-laden average gasoline wholesale price,
denoted as gp , which in 2017 was $1.689/gal.
10 In the postulated competitive refining/blending
industry that operates under constant returns to scale, we should have g gp p B  , where the
bundle of obligations term B  was introduced in section 2.2. The average ethanol wholesale price, 
denoted  ep  in section 2.2 as, was $1.45/gal in 2017.
11 The average gasoline motor fuel tax, denoted as
  in section 2.2,  is $0.449/gal.12  Together with the values of R  and B , we calibrate the cost of E10 
9 The prices of D4, D5, and D6 RINs (RIN year 2017 and transfer year 2017) are 4 1.03Dp  ,  
5 0.91Dp  , and 6 0.72Dp  , respectively, from EPA, https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-
reporting-and-compliance-help/rin-trades-and-price-information. Hence, from section 2,
4 5 60.0167 0.0071 0.0832 0.0836D D DB p p p    . 
10 The gasoline wholesale price is from EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_a.htm. It is the “Motor Gasoline” price under 
“Sales for Resale” category. 
11 The ethanol wholesale price is the ethanol rack price in Omaha, Nebraska. 
12 The average gasoline motor fuel tax is from Moschini, Lapan, and Kim (2017). We do not consider 
the per-unit marketing/retailing costs. First, the marketing/retailing costs are too small to have a 
significant effect on the model results. Moreover, we will show next that any cost would be 
absorbed by the value of t  in our calibration procedure.  
Journal Pre-proof
22 
fuel to be 2.0421Ac  and the cost of E85 fuel to be 1.4283Bc   (recall that fuels are measured in 
volume terms, and they possess different energy content).  
For the FFV fraction α, in 2017 there were 20.34 million FFVs and 215.09 million gasoline vehicles (cars 
and light trucks categories).13  Hence, we estimate 0.0864  . As it has been shown in the 
indifference consumers and equations (14)-(21) in section 3, the reservation utility u  has no effect on 
driver’s choice of fuel so we do not specify an exact value for u . In the duopoly models, we assume 
u  is large enough so that all drivers would choose to refuel. For the parameter t , in the basic 
Hotelling’s model this parameter decides the E10 equilibrium price margin: as discussed in section 
3.4, the equilibrium E10 price in the basic Hotelling model is equal to t c , hence the retail price 
margin is t . The retail price of E10 in 2017 was $2.3625/gal.14 Given the cost of E85 discussed earlier, 
the margin for E10 is $0.3204, so we set  0.32t  .   
Concerning the bounds  ,   of the distribution of consumers’ preferences for the high-ethanol
attribute of E85, we have assumed  0   and 0  . That is, FFV drivers with high preferences for 
E85 are willing to pay a premium, whereas FFV drivers with low preferences for E85 would only 
purchase it under some price discount. To calibrate these bound parameters, we rely on WTP 
estimates, as well as specific features of our model. Pouliot, Liao, and Babcock (2018) estimate the 
WTP for E85 in the United States using survey data. The survey targeted at FFV drivers and their 
estimates of WTP show that about 25% of motorists would prefer E85 when E85 and E10 are equally 
priced at energy-equivalent unit. The result would suggest that ( ) 0.25    , implying 3   . 
Next, recall that we would like our highly stylized model to capture a realistic scenario with the 
baseline parameters. Specifically, we would like to ensure that, in the baseline, 1 1x   and 0   
(recall Figure 2). Numerical exploration of the model indicates that the value of   has little effect on 
1x  and 0 ,  but 1x  and 0  vary significantly with  . To ensure that 1 1x  ,   needs to be lower 
than 0.27. Hence, we pick 0.25  , which satisfies this constraint and still allows for “green” drivers 
to have a nontrivial WTP for E85 (this value implies that the highest WTP for FFV drivers is $0.25/gal 
under our model normalization; to fuel a car with capacity of 16 gal, this is equivalent to $4/tank). 
13 EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2017. 
14 Quarterly nationwide average retail prices of E10 are from the Clean Cities Alternative Fuel Price 
Report. The annual average price is just the average of each quarter. 
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Given the value of  , from the relation 3    derived earlier, we have 0.75   (which also 
implies that the desired condition 0   is satisfied). In any event, we conduct the sensitivity 
analysis of model results under different   and   (Appendix D). In sum, the baseline parameter 
values used for our benchmark analysis are: 0.5143s  , 2.0421Ac  , 1.4283Bc  , 0.0864  , 
0.32t  , 0.25  , and 0.75   . In the next section, we show the results of different models 
under baseline values of all parameters. We also evaluate how results are affected by changes in the 
subsidy of E85.   
5. Results
We first present the Nash equilibrium results for duopoly models under the alternative conditions of 
no E85 fuel, incomplete penetration of E85 stations (only the station at L0 sells E85), and complete 
penetration of E85 stations (all stations sell both fuels). Next, in the comparative statics section, we 
evaluate how results are affected by changes in the subsidy level of E85. 
5.1 Baseline results 
Results for the three duopoly models are reported in Table 1. For the models with no E85, we report 
both the analytic solutions and the values of these solutions at the baseline parameters. This permits 
a straightforward comparison with the main model—where E85 is only sold in one station—for 
which we can only find numerical solutions. For the model with E85 at both stations, we report the 
numerical solutions where the analytic solutions are not applicable. For each case, we report 
equilibrium prices and quantities, profits for the two stations. We report the pass-through rate, 
defined as  A Bp p s    in section 2.2, which measures the rate at which the subsidy brought
about by RINs is passed on to the retail spread between E85 and E10 prices. Because both stations 
provide E10, we report  A Bp p s    as the average of  0 0A Bp p s    and  1 0A Bp p s   . The 
effects of the subsidy s  on individual prices are discussed in section 5.2. The process of computing all 
pass-through rates is detailed in Appendix B.  
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Table 1. Nash Equilibrium Outcomes for Duopoly Models 
No E85 stations 
One E85 
station 
Two E85 
stations 
Analytic 
solution 
Baseline 
values 
Numerical 
solution 
Numerical 
solution 
0
Ap Ac t 2.3621 2.3627 2.3630 
1
Ap Ac t 2.3621 2.3606 2.3630 
0
Bp - - 1.7772 1.7251 
1
Bp - - - 1.7251 
)( A Bp p
s
 

- - 0.7188 0.9665 
0
Ad
1
2
0.5000 0.4807 0.4811 
1
Ad
1
2
0.5000 0.4959 0.4811 
0
Bd - - 0.0292 0.0236 
1
Bd - - - 0.0236 
0
2
t
0.1600 0.1643 0.1614 
1 2
t
0.1600 0.1579 0.1614 
From Table 1, we see the effects of competition as the possibility of E85 substituting for E10 is 
introduced. Adding an E85 pump at L0 causes E10 price at the same location to increase slightly while 
E10 price at the other location decreases. Demand for E10 at both locations decreases (recall that, 
with the assumed covered market condition with a given mass of consumers, the availability of E85 
substitutes for some E10 at both locations).  In the model with only one E85 location, E85 
consumption is 0.0292 at baseline parameter values, which means that about 27% ( 0Bd   ) of FFV 
drivers choose E85. Adding another E85 location increases E85 consumption by 61.6%. Having an E85 
pump increases the L0 gas station’s profit by 2.69% but decreases the other gas station’s profits by 
1.31%. 
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The pass-through rate of the E85 subsidy due to RIN prices, at the baseline parameters, is 0.7188 (i.e., 
approximately 70%). Hence, competition with incomplete penetration of E85 stations is 
characterized by incomplete pass-through. This result formalizes the role of retail market power in 
affecting pass-through of RIN prices to retail prices. The gas station at L0 has a product that the 
other station does not have, it is effectively a monopoly for E85. The exercises of this market power, 
by raising E85 prices, is constrained by the fact that E10 is also sold by the same station (in addition 
to being sold by a competitor station). Still, at the equilibrium solution the markup, over cost, of the 
E85 price is higher than for E10.  
It is interesting to note that the market power that is relevant for the pass-through effect just 
discussed differs from the source of market power that arises from the structure of the basic 
Hotelling model. In the model with E85 available at both locations, the pass-through rate is still 
incomplete but close to one (0.9665), which implies that it is the market power from exclusivity of 
selling E85 that mostly determines the incompleteness of the pass-through of the E85 subsidy, rather 
than the market power stemming from horizontal differentiation. The incompleteness of pass-
through rate is very much related to the difference in the markups of E10 and E85. In the model with 
pure E10, the markup over cost is 0.32t  ; in the model with pure E85, the markup over cost is 
0.4t  —that is, it is more profitable to sell E85 than E10 to an FFV driver. In the model with both 
fuels at both locations, this effect provides an incentive for stations to decrease the price of E85 
while increasing the price of E10. The equilibrium markup of each fuel depends on the relative 
demand elasticities. The results show that, in equilibrium, the markup of E85 is 0.3713 (  B Bp c 
) while the markup of E10 is 0.3208 ( A Ap c  ). 
Essentially, the availability of E85, together with consumer heterogeneity, brings about 
differentiation along a vertical attribute. This is valuable to a firm only insofar as it has some 
exclusivity. When all stations sell E85, alongside E10, this exclusivity vanishes and what remains is the 
horizontal differentiation of consumers, which is what endows firms with some limited market 
power in the Hotelling model. With full penetration of E85 stations, the value of the E85 subsidy is 
mostly captured by consumers.  
Despite the fact that full penetration of E85 stations brings limited additional profit to the fuel-
retailing firms, this situation should not be interpreted as a lack of incentives for retail stations to 
adopt E85 pumps. It is quite clear that, with incomplete penetration, the station that sells E85 enjoys 
higher returns than in the case when no station carries E85 (0.1644 > 0.16), and the firm who does 
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not sells E85 in the case of incomplete penetration can increase its profit by also adopting an E85 
pump (0.1614 > 0.1579). Although this model is not quite suited to investigate the conditions for 
optimal entry of E85 stations, the structure of the model is such that the “excess entry” result 
discussed by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is expected to apply. 
5.2 Comparative statics 
Of all parameters, the subsidy is of the most interest. Assessing the effect subsidy provides us key 
implications on evaluating the effectiveness of the RIN system. For the model with E85, for which we 
only have numerical solutions, in this section we present some numerical comparative statics results. 
Here, we focus specifically on understanding how varying the subsidy may affect the pass-through 
rate in equilibrium outcomes for the duopoly model with one E85 station (incomplete penetration of 
E85). Corresponding results for the duopoly model with two E85 stations (full penetration of E85) 
are reported in the Appendix C. Comparative statics results for parameters other than the subsidy 
level are reported in Appendix D.  
To evaluate the equilibrium results under alternative values of the subsidy, all other parameters 
(except the cost of E85, which is directly affected by the subsidy as in equation (7)) are held at their 
baseline values. The results, reported in tabular form in the Appendix, are summarized in Figure 5. 
The vertical black dashed line in Figure 5 represents the baseline subsidy value of s =0.5143. The 
dotted points along the separate lines mean that pass-through rates in the model are not a 
continuous function of the subsidy. The discontinuity is a result of the fact that alternative demand 
system configurations can be attained under different values of the subsidy. These alternative 
“cases,” illustrated earlier in Figure 2 and Figure 3, are specifically labeled in Figure 5.  In Appendix A, 
we provide the actual values of the subsidy at the kink points in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Pass-through rate and the E85 subsidy in the duopoly model with one E85 station 
From Figure 5, we see that when the subsidy s  is small ( 0.1089s  , as shown in Appendix A), no E85 
is sold in the market, and the pass-through rate (to the implicit choke-off prices) is equal to 1. In this 
case, even if the gas station passes all the subsidy to FFV drivers, the latter would still choose to 
refuel with E10 as the price of E85 is not low enough to compensate for its low energy content (even 
for the FFV driver with highest preference for E85). At 0.1089s  , the gas station at L0 is just 
indifferent between selling E10 or E85, and the FFV driver with highest preference for E85 is just 
indifferent between choosing E10 or E85 at L0. Then the pass-through rates jump to 2 3  (for 
0.1809 0.1569s  ), which is exactly the pass-through of subsidy/tax on an obligated product in 
equation (3).  This corresponds to case 1 in Figure 3, for which   . In this case, the equilibrium 
results show that offering E85 in the market has no effect on the equilibrium prices of E10—E10 
prices at both locations are t c . So, when the subsidy is low such that E85 does not directly 
compete with E10 at another location, the introduction of E85 in the market will not affect the 
equilibrium price of E10. For higher values of the subsidy, specifically over the domain 
0.1569 0.5265s  , the pass-through rate decreases from 0.9402 to 0.7179 as the subsidy increases. 
For still higher values of the subsidy, over the domain 0.5265 1.4735s  , the pass-through rate 
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
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stays around 0.5, and then decreases toward zero as 1.4735s  . Note that case 5 of Figure 3 is not 
depicted in Figure 5 because case 5 only materializes when 2.1343s  (we observe a small jump from 
case 4 to case 5, and the pass-through rate then monotonically decreases to zero in case 5). 
Comparative statics for the pass-through rate in the duopoly model with two E85 locations are 
presented in Appendix C. Similar to the duopoly model with one E85 station, we find that the pass-
through rate in the model with two E85 stations is not a continuous function of the subsidy. 
Furthermore, the complete penetration of E85 stations has notable effects on the pass-through rate. 
Instead of generally decreasing with s  as in the one E85 station situation (recall Figure 5), with two 
E85 stations the pass-through rate increases toward one.  
In Figure 6, we provide some additional details by reporting the equilibrium prices, shares of FFV 
drivers who choose each fuel, and pass-through to individual fuels at values of the subsidy from 0 to 
1.8. The orange line represents the equilibrium results of E10 at L0; the red line represents the 
equilibrium results of E85 at L0; and, the blue line represents the equilibrium results of E10 at L1. The 
vertical dashed line standing near 0.5 indicates the baseline value of s .  
The top panel of Figure 6 depicts the equilibrium prices of each fuel. It shows that under the 
assumption of constant E10 cost, the retail prices of E10 barely change. As shown by the equilibrium 
results at representative values of the subsidy reported in Table C1 in Appendix C, E10 price at L0 is 
higher than that at L1. The decrease in E85 prices as s  increases is significant, which is in line with the 
pass-through rate in the duopoly model with one E85 station. The middle panel of Figure 6 reports 
the share of FFV drivers who choose each fuel rather than the demands of each fuel. With larger 
subsidy, the share of FFV drivers who choose to refuel with E85 goes from 0 to 0.9, and the share of 
FFV drivers who choose to refuel with E10 at L0 decreases from 0.5 to 0. The share of FFV drivers 
who choose to refuel with E10 at L1 also decreases but slower. The bottom panel of Figure 6 reports 
the pass-through of the subsidy to each retail price, defined as 0Ap s  , 
0
Bp s   and
1
Ap s  ,
respectively. Note that the pass-through rate reported in Table 1,  A Bp p s   , is equivalent to
 0 1 00.5 A A Bp s p s p s        . The equilibrium results of the duopoly model with two E85
locations are relegated to Appendix C. Numerical equilibrium results at some representative values 
of s  in both models are also reported in Appendix C. 
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Figure 6. Simulated equilibrium results in the duopoly model with one E85 station 
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The advantage of a stylized model, such as ours, is that we can evaluate the partial effect of each 
parameter on the model result. In additional to the subsidy, we run the model with alternative values 
of some key parameters—the fraction of FFVs ( ), Hotelling’s “travel cost” parameter ( t ), high 
type preference ( ), and low type preference (  ).15 We analyze the impact of each parameter one 
at a time, holding all other parameters at their baseline values. We find that equilibrium prices and 
the pass-through rate barely change with   and   . The effects of these two parameters on E85 
demand are proportional: larger   relates to more FFV drivers and larger   in absolute value 
corresponds to smaller proportion of high type FFV drivers. As t  increases, all equilibrium prices 
increase as expected (recall that t  is reflected in the price margin in the Hotelling’s model), along 
with the pass-through rate (the increase is moderate as shown in Table D4 in Appendix D).  The 
parameter   has little effect on equilibrium E10 prices, whereas an increase of this preference 
parameter results in higher E85 price and lower pass-through rate. 
6. More on market power: monopoly
In Hotelling’s framework, firms have some relief from the predicament of price competition. Firms 
enjoy some local market power because of the spatial heterogeneity of consumers, vis-à-vis the 
location of the retailing firms. The intensity of this effect is captured by the parameter t . The 
possibility of selling E85 provides an additional venue for a station to extract rent from consumers’ 
vertical differentiation, provided the station has some exclusivity in its access to E85. In our modeling 
framework, such a situation is captured by E85 being available at only one of the two stations. With 
full penetration of E85, the pass-through rate is almost complete and the profits from selling an 
additional fuel are quite limited.   
There are reasons to believe that the characterization of market power provided by Hotelling’s 
model may be insufficient in our setting. Firms may be able to enjoy more market power if they 
collude. Indeed, the possibility of tacit collusion is particularly real in settings, such as fuel retailing, 
where firms interact repeatedly (Tirole 1988). Furthermore, in reality, neighboring stations/brands 
may be owned by the same firm. As shown by Hastings (2004), the loss of independent, unbranded 
competitor would increase local fuel price. In such cases, market outcomes close to monopolistic 
may be quite plausible. 
15 Tables of results with alternative values of these parameters are reported in Appendix D, 
specifically Table D1-Table D4. 
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To investigate the effects that collusive behavior may have on the market outcomes of interest, in 
this section we solve the monopoly problem that would arise if the two stations in our model 
perfectly coordinated their choices (for both E10 and E85) with the objective of maximizing joint 
profit. The demand structures in the monopoly models with one or two E85 stations are the same as 
those under their duopoly counterparts. Thus, there are five cases in the monopoly with one E85 
station, and three cases in the monopoly with two E85 stations. However, the values of subsidy at 
the kink points are different (see Appendix A). At the baseline values of all parameters, the demand 
structure that applies to monopoly with one E85 station is the same as in Figure 2, and in the model 
with two E85 stations is the same as Figure 4.  
In the case of monopoly, we can find analytic solutions for the settings where there is no E85 station, 
and where both stations sell both fuels. When only one of the two stations sells E85, however, we 
again need to resort to a numerical solution.  A monopoly, given the characterization of consumers’ 
preferences used in the model, would want to charge the highest possible price, conditional on 
consumers’ participation that ensures a covered market. This condition, in term of prices, requires 
0 1 2A Ap p u t    (it can be verified that a covered market is indeed a profit-maximizing feature of 
the parameter space we investigate). Profit maximization solutions for the monopoly case when 
there is no E85 are 0 1 2A Ap p u t     (at these prices the consumer most distant to a station,
located at 0.5x  , is just willing to refuel). Unlike the duopoly model, we need the value of 
reservation utility u  to get the numerical solutions in the monopoly models. To make the result 
comparable with the duopoly model, we choose the value of u  such that in the case with no E85, 
equilibrium price of E10 is same with that of the duopoly model. So, when there is no E85, 
0 1 2.3621A Ap p  , implying 2.5221u  . Equilibrium values of other variables of interest are 
reported in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Nash equilibrium outcomes for Monopoly model 
No E85 stations 
One E85 
station 
Two E85 stations 
Analytic 
solution 
Baseline 
values 
Numerical 
solution 
Analytic solution 
Baseline 
values 
0
Ap 2
t
u  2.3621 2.3617 
2
t
u  2.3621 
1
Ap 2
t
u  2.3621 2.3625 
2
t
u  2.3621 
0
Bp - - 1.8546 
 12
2 8
B A tu t c c  
 
   
 1.8790 
1
Bp - - - 
 12
2 8
B A tu t c c  
 
   
 1.8790 
)( A Bp p
s
 
 - - 0.6051 
1
2
0.5000 
0
Ad 0.5 0.5000 0.4895  
 11
2 44 A B
t
c c

 
 
 
    
  0.4895 
1
Ad 0.5 0.5000 0.4948  
 11
2 44 A B
t
c c

 
 
 
    
  0.4895 
0
Bd - - 0.0196  
 1
44 A B
t
c c

 
 
 
   
   0.0131 
1
Bd - - -  
 1
44 A B
t
c c

 
 
 
   
   0.0131 
  
2
t
u c  0.32 0.3234 
 
 
2
1
4
2 4
A B
A
t
c c
t
u c
   
 
 
       
   
 
0.3251 
Because of our model setup, the equilibrium price level is largely determined by the parameter u  
(which has no effect on the competitive duopoly equilibrium analyzed in the previous section). 
Adding an E85 pump only at location L0 decreases the E10 price at the same location and increases 
the E10 price at the other location, which contrasts with the results we found for duopoly. The price 
effects of introducing E85, however, are minimal, as the monopoly charges the maximum price 
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consistent with retaining a covered market. The monopoly’s total profits, reported in Table 2, show 
that adding E85 pumps to one or both stations increases profits. The additional profit afforded by 
E85, however, is minimal, a reflection of the small size of the E85 market at the baseline. E85 
consumption slightly increases with implementation of E85 at another location. Comparing of profit 
outcomes under duopoly and monopoly also provides some insights concerning the incentive for 
adoption of E85 pumps. At baseline parameter values, under duopoly we find that the station at L1 
can increase its profit by 0.0035 by also adding an E85 pump. Under monopoly, the comparable 
additional profit is 0.0017. Hence, full penetration of E85 stations is less likely when collusive 
behavior at the retailing level applies.  
Of more direct interest to us is the pass-through of the E85 subsidy, which turns out to be 
incomplete. When only one station sells E85, the pass-through rate is 60.51%, clearly lower than what 
is attained under duopoly. Perhaps most interestingly, full penetration of E85 stations lowers, rather 
than increasing, the equilibrium pass-through rate. Table 2 shows that the pass-through rate of the 
E85 subsidy is just 50% when both stations sell both fuels, regardless of other parameters, as long as 
the baseline demand configuration applies.16 To get a full idea of how pass-through rate evolves with 
the subsidy under incomplete penetration, we provide the following Figure 7.  
16 In the model with two E85 stations, from the analytic solution for Bp  in Table 2, the pass-through 
of subsidy is ½ to the E85 price and zero to the E10 price, hence the pass-through rate is ½. 
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Figure 7. Pass-through rate and the E85 subsidy in the monopoly model with one E85 station 
In Figure 7, we depict the equilibrium pass-through rate for the subsidy ranging from 0s   to 1.8s 
(taking Ac  as given). The dotted lines connecting the pass-through rates show that they are not 
continuous functions of the subsidy s . The vertical black dashed line indicates the baseline value s
=0.5143. Figure 7 shows that when 0.1089 0.1569s   the pass-through rate is 2/3 as in equation (3). 
Indeed, for this domain the pass-through rate is 2/3 in all models that we have considered—the 
duopoly model with one E85 station in Figure 5, the duopoly model with two E85 stations in Figure in 
the Appendix, and the monopoly model with two E85 stations in Figure in the Appendix. This means 
that, for these relatively low subsidy levels, market structure (duopoly or monopoly) and the number 
of E85 stations (one or two) have no effect on the pass-through rate nor on E10 prices, as there is no 
direct competition between E85 and E10 at different locations. Over the domain 0.1569 0.6518s  , 
the pass-through rate increases with the subsidy level (from around 0.5 to a little higher than 0.6). 
For 0.6518s  , the pass-through rate stays around 0.5, jumping down at 1.6141s   and decreasing 
toward zero for large subsidy levels. In the monopoly model with two E85 stations, details for which 
are reported in the Appendix C, the pass-through rate exhibits a similar behavior as with the one E85 
station case of Figure 7. 
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
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The foregoing results, together with Figure 5, establish that when market power arises from 
exclusivity of selling E85 (duopoly model with one E85 station) or general collusive/monopoly power, 
then the pass-through rate decreases toward zero as the subsidy level increases. Conversely, if 
market power arises just horizontal differentiation (duopoly model with two E85 stations), then the 
pass-through rate increases toward one as the subsidy level increases.  
7. Conclusion
The RFS implemented by the United States over the last decade represents an ambitious policy 
aimed at promoting the substitution of fossil fuel with renewable fuel. To fulfill the mandates 
envisioned by the RFS, it is becoming necessary for the market to absorb an increasing amount of 
biofuel as high-ethanol blends, such as E85. The mechanism that should bring this about is rooted in 
RIN prices, which simultaneously constitute an implicit subsidy for biofuels and a tax on fossil fuels. 
The effectiveness of this mechanism, however, depends critically on the E85 subsidy, due to RIN 
prices, to pass through to consumers. Indeed, as noted by previous research, owners of FFVs “… will 
have little incentive to use E85 unless it is priced significantly lower than gasoline” (Collantes 2010). 
The findings of an emerging empirical literature, discussed earlier, suggest obstacles to the pass-
through of RIN prices to retail E85 prices. It seems that the pass-through of the E85 subsidy, 
mediated by RIN prices, may be incomplete and the pass-through rate relates to the possible 
existence of market power.  
In this paper, we build a structural model of how market power may arise in E85 retailing, and use 
this model to gain insights into the nature of imperfect competition in this market, and the role of 
the E85 subsidy in determining the market outcomes of interest. Our model is rooted in Hotelling’s 
spatial competition framework, which provides a natural representation of gas stations’ market 
power due to location differentiation. This basic model is extended to account for important 
features of the market for E85, specifically the imperfect substitution between E85 and E10 (which 
itself depends on consumer heterogeneity), and the limited availability of E85 stations. We 
specifically evaluate three duopoly models and, to gain further insights into the role of market 
power, three monopoly models. Analytic solutions for the Nash equilibrium are possible only for the 
basic Hotelling’s models (and the extended model with full penetration of E85 stations under 
monopoly). For all other models we resort to numerical solutions (upon calibration of key models 
parameters, consistent with real-world data). 
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Results from the model suggest that pass-through of the E85 subsidy to retail prices is indeed 
generally incomplete. In our baseline model, which maintains the incomplete penetration of E85 
refueling stations, the equilibrium pass-through rate is about 70%. With full penetration of E85 pumps 
(i.e., all stations offer both E10 and E85), the pass-through of the E85 subsidy to retail prices is near 
complete (even though gas stations retain some market power from their location differentiation). 
In the collusive outcome whereby gas stations act as a monopoly (as may arise from tacit collusion 
due to repeated interaction), the pass-through rate is significantly lower; furthermore, in this case, 
full penetration of E85 pumps decreases the equilibrium pass-through rate (rather than increasing it, 
as in the duopoly model). Noticeably, when E85 only substitutes for E10 demand at the same location 
but not E10 demand at the other location, the pass-through rate is 2/3 regardless of whether it is 
monopoly or duopoly, partial or full penetration of E85. When the subsidy is large enough (i.e., 
greater than some threshold levels, which take different values in different models), the pass-
through rate goes to one in the duopoly model with two E85 stations, whereas in the other three 
models (duopoly with one E85 station, monopoly with one E85 station, and monopoly with two E85 
stations) the pass-through rate goes to zero. The result highlights the different implications for 
market power that arise from horizontal differentiation as opposed to from stations’ exclusivity (or 
monopoly power) in selling E85 fuel.  
The model we build enables us to examine the effect of the subsidy on equilibrium fuel prices and 
demands. We show, as expected, E85 consumption increases with the subsidy. When the subsidy 
increases from 0.1 (when 0.1s  , there is no E85 consumption in the market) to 1, the percentage of 
FFV drivers who refuel with E85 goes up from 0% to 58%. However, as the FFV fleet size is quite small 
( 0.0864  ), even at the subsidy level of $1.00, only 5% of all drivers would choose to refuel with 
E85. We show that the introduction of E85 has little effect on E10 prices and the effect is different in 
duopoly and in monopoly. In duopoly, price of E10 at the same location with E85 is slightly higher 
than that at the other location, whereas in monopoly it reverses. This result may serve as an indicator 
of monopoly power. Both in duopoly and monopoly, introduction of one E85 station reduces E10 
demand at the same location more than E10 demand at the other station. 
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Highlights         
Requirements (3-5 bullet points, maximum 85 characters, including spaces, per bullet point) 
 We study the pass-through rate of the E85 subsidy to the E10-E85 retail price spread under
imperfect competition.
 We extend Hotelling’s model to capture both spatial competition and the imperfect
substitutability between E10 and E85.
 Results show that the pass-through is about 0.7 when only one-half of the stations carry E85.
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